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[5月11日]微觀(guān)理論workshop

發(fā)布日期：2023-05-08 01:03    來(lái)源：

Dynamic Contracting with Flexible Monitoring

時(shí)間：5月11日（周四）10:30 a.m.-12:00

地點(diǎn)：經(jīng)院302教室

主講人：戴亮（上海交通大學(xué)副教授）

主持老師：吳澤南，石凡奇（經(jīng)院）；胡岠（國發(fā)院）

參與老師：胡濤，吳澤南，石凡奇（經(jīng)院）；汪浩，胡岠（國發(fā)院）；翁翕（光華）

 

摘要：We study a principal’s joint design of optimal monitoring and compensation schemes to incentivize an agent by incorporating information design into a dynamic contracting framework. The principal can flexibly allocate her limited monitoring capacity between seeking evidence that confirms or contradicts the agent’s effort, as the basis for reward or punishment. When the agent’s continuation value is low, the principal seeks only confirmatory evidence. When it exceeds a threshold, the principal seeks mainly contradictory evidence. Importantly, the agent’s effort is perpetuated if and only if he is sufficiently productive.

 

主講人介紹：Liang Dai is an Associate Professor of Economics at Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University. He obtained his Ph.D. in economics from Princeton University in 2015. His research focuses on applied microeconomic theory, and his work has been published in Journal of Economic Theory.